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CASENOTE; In re Conservatorship of Minor Children: When Dad is 
the Defendant, Who Gets to Parent? 
 
Caitlin S. Williams 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The right of a parent to raise his child is fundamental, and courts 
are reluctant to impede on that right when determining the best interests of 
a child.1 In In re Conservatorship of Minor Children,2 the Montana 
Supreme Court was faced with deciding whether to appoint a guardian ad 
litem on behalf of three children for the purpose of potentially pursuing 
litigation against their father.  
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In January 2012, Michael and Jennifer Soule, parents of J.S., K.S., 
and R.S., were involved in a car accident that resulted in Jennifer’s death.3 
Michael was charged with both vehicular homicide and driving under the 
influence, although the charges were ultimately dismissed for various 
reasons.4 Despite the charges, Michael maintained he could not recall who 
was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.5 Safeco insured the 
vehicle involved in the accident and disbursed the policy limit of $300,000 
to the Soule’s three children.6 The children’s maternal grandfather was 
appointed as conservator only to the extent of overseeing the settlement 
disbursement, and the district court appointed an attorney, Benjamin Alke, 
to represent the children in respect to the settlement.7 In his role as the 
children’s advocate, Mr. Alke recognized a potential lawsuit against their 
father as well as his business, which carried an insurance policy limit of 
$1,000,000.8 Mr. Alke then petitioned for the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem to determine if pursuing further litigation was in the children’s 
best interests.9 Michael Soule objected to the appointment, as he argued 
that additional litigation would further traumatize his children.10 Prior to 
the hearing regarding the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the eldest of 
the Soule children attempted suicide.11 The district court then appointed 
retired Judge Dorothy McCarter as guardian ad litem to determine if 
                                           
1 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000). 
2 In re Conservatorship of Minor Children, 362 P.3d 76 (Mont. 2015). 
3 Id. at 78. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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further litigation was in the children’s best interests, and appointed Mr. 
Alke as the children’s attorney for the purpose of pursuing any such 
claims.12 Michael Soule then appealed to the Montana Supreme Court 
regarding the district court’s appointment of a guardian ad litem.13  
  
III.   MAJORITY HOLDING 
 
The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s holding 
both for abuse of discretion and in consideration of the children’s best 
interests.14 The Court divided the issue before it into three parts: “whether 
the appointment of a guardian for the purpose of considering and possibly 
pursuing litigation was an abuse of discretion, whether authorizing the 
guardian to undertake certain duties was an abuse of discretion, and 
whether the appointment was in the children’s best interests.”15  
 
A.   Abuse of Discretion 
 
The Court first analyzed the statutes under which guardians can 
be appointed, including Mont. Code Ann. § 25–5–301, which allows 
appointment of a guardian when litigation is in contemplation and the 
minor is a plaintiff,16 and Mont. Code Ann. § 41–1–202, which affords 
minors the same rights as adults when acting through a guardian.17 The 
Court reconciled the two statutes by analyzing the statutory construction 
and adhering to the principle that “[a]n interpretation of a statute which 
gives it effect is preferred to one which makes it void.”18 The Court 
reasoned that in order for a minor to have the same rights as an adult, and 
in order for a minor to be a plaintiff in litigation, the minor must be able 
to commence litigation through a guardian ad litem.19 The Court held that 
since the guardian ad litem in the instant case was indeed appointed in 
contemplation of litigation, the district court did not abuse its discretion.20 
The Court further identified that not only was litigation against their father 
a possibility, but if the children were to pursue those claims, they could 
only do so through a guardian ad litem.21  
 
 
 
                                           
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 79. 
15 Id. 
16 MONT. CODE ANN. § 25–5–301 (2015). 
17 MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–1–202. 
18 In re Minor Children, 362 P.3d at 79, citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 1–3–232. 
19 Id. at 79–80. 
20 Id. at 79. 
21 Id. 
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B.   Duties of the Guardian ad Litem 
 
Since the statute authorizing appointment of a guardian in 
contemplation of litigation involving a minor does not list the duties of 
said guardian, the Court looked instead at the duties of a guardian in 
reference to child custody and support proceedings.22 The statute 
governing guardians in those instances identifies the guardian’s duties as:  
(a) to conduct investigations that the guardian ad litem considers necessary 
to ascertain the facts . . . ; (b) to interview or observe the child or who is 
the subject of the proceeding; . . . (d) to appear and participate in all 
proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately represent the child and 
make recommendations to the court . . . ; and (e) to perform other duties 
as directed by the court.23  
The Court reasoned that a guardian ad litem representing minor 
children in potential litigation against their father would utilize “[s]imilar 
investigatory and representative functions”24 as a guardian in a child 
support or custody proceeding, and thus those duties would be considered 
in analyzing the district court’s appointment of a guardian.25 The district 
court appointed the guardian to determine if pursuing further litigation was 
in the children’s best interests, to communicate with the children’s family 
members regarding such claims, and to access the children’s information 
to the extent necessary to pursue litigation.26 The Supreme Court held that 
those duties were consistent with those listed in the aforementioned 
statute, and thus the district court’s authorization of the guardian to 
perform such duties was not an abuse of discretion.27  
 
C.   The Children’s Best Interests 
 
The final consideration in analyzing whether the district court 
abused its discretion was to determine if the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem was in the best interests of the children.28 The guardian was 
appointed pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 25-5-301, which offers no 
guidance as to what the best interests of the children are.29 As a result, the 
Court again looked to another title within the Montana Code Annotated 
for instruction, namely the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”).30 The UPC 
states that “[t]he court may appoint as guardian any person whose 
                                           
22 Id. at 80. 
23 Id., citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 40–4–205(2). 
24 In re Conservatorship of Minor Children, 362 P.3d at 80. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 MONT. CODE ANN. § 25–5–301. 
30 Id. 
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appointment would be in the best interests of the minor.”31 The Court 
interpreted that provision in In re Krause32 to mean “that the person 
appointed must not have interests adverse to those of the child.”33 In the 
instant case, the Court had to determine whether the decision to pursue 
further litigation on behalf of the children should be made by the children’s 
father or by a guardian ad litem.34 Michael Soule objected to the 
appointment of the guardian, arguing that as the children’s father he was 
in the best position to determine what the best interests of the children 
were.35 However, the Court recognized that because Michael and his 
business would be the adverse parties if further litigation was pursued, his 
decisions may stem more from protecting his interests than considering 
the best interests of his children.36 For that reason, the Court upheld the 
district court’s decision to appoint a guardian ad litem over Michael’s 
objection.37  
 
IV.   JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT 
 
Justice McKinnon dissented from the majority opinion, stating she 
would have held the District Court abused its discretion by appointing a 
guardian ad litem.38 The majority interpreted Mont. Code Ann. § 25–5–
301 as allowing a minor to commence litigation through a guardian so as 
to give effect to Mont. Code Ann. § 41–1–202, which affords minors the 
same rights as adults when acting through a guardian.39 Justice McKinnon, 
on the other hand, argued that the plain language of Mont. Code. Ann. § 
25–5–301 only allows appointment of a guardian when a minor is a party 
to a case.40 She further argues that “[t]here is no authority for a court to 
appoint a guardian ad litem for minor children, against the wishes of the 
children’s only surviving parent, when no proceeding is pending before 
the court.”41 Justice McKinnon also acknowledged the novelty of the 
majority’s holding, noting“[w]e have never appointed a guardian ad litem 
absent a pending proceeding simply for the purpose of allowing the 
guardian ad litem to investigate potential claims against a parent who is 
fit.”42 Justice McKinnon also disagreed with the scope of the guardian’s 
duties, arguing the guardian ad litem’s initial duties were related to “a 
                                           
31 MONT. CODE ANN. § 72–5–223. 
32 19 P.3d 811 (Mont. 2001). 
33 In re Minor Children, 362 P.3d at 80 (citing In re Krause at 814). 
34 Id. at 78. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 80–81. 
37 Id. at 81. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 79. 
40 Id. at 81 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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limited conservatorship proceeding”43 for the purpose of overseeing the 
Safeco settlement disbursement.44 McKinnon argues any role beyond 
those related to the Safeco settlement unnecessarily intrudes into the 
private lives of Michael Soules and his children.45 Additionally, she argues 
that since the Court did not deem Michael Soules as an unfit parent, “there 
is no justification for appointment of a guardian ad litem to usurp a father’s 
decisions regarding what is in his children’s best interests.”46 McKinnon 
also recognized the potential impact that further litigation will have on the 
children, noting they will likely be involved in the discovery process “as 
they are peculiarly situated to know the habits and customs of their parents, 
particularly as they relate to who might have been driving.”47 Justice 
McKinnon concluded her dissent by acknowledging that parents are often 
faced with making difficult decisions on behalf of their children that result 
in a conflict of interest.48 She cited to two United States Supreme Court 
decisions that clarify and enforce an individual’s fundamental right to 
parent his children, and the states’ reluctance to infringe upon that right.49  
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
While the majority offered a detailed walk-through of the statutory 
authority used to reach its decision, the dissent identified several flaws and 
consequences of the ultimate outcome. Additionally, there are three 
underlying issues in this case that were not fully explored in the opinion: 
(1) the father was not deemed unfit and therefore unable to make decisions 
on behalf of his children; (2) the majority uses guardianship statutes from 
several different titles within the Montana Code Annotated; and (3) the 
opinion did not discuss how the minor children actually wished to proceed.  
 
A.   Fitness of the Father 
 
The majority effectively argued appointing a guardian ad litem 
was necessary because the father’s interests “are by definition potentially 
adverse to those of his children because he and his business would be 
named defendants in a lawsuit filed on their behalf.”50 However, as noted 
both by the majority and in Justice McKinnon’s dissent, there was no 
evidence offered or determination made that Michael Soule was an unfit 
parent.51 The fact that Michael Soule is considered a fit parent is 
                                           
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 81–82. 
46 Id. at 82. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id., citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. 
50 Id. at 80. 
51 Id. at 80–81. 
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significant because fit parents are presumptively able to make decisions 
that serve the best interests of their children.52 So although Michael Soule 
is considered a fit parent who can make decisions on behalf of his minor 
children in every other respect, in these proceedings his fitness as a parent 
was insufficient when deciding whether to subject his children to further 
litigation. Although the majority acknowledged Michael Soule was a fit 
parent, it did not reconcile the inconsistency arising from the conclusion 
that he is not able to make a decision on behalf of his children that is truly 
in their best interests. This case poses an interesting exploration into when 
the state can impose its own judgment as to the best interests of a child in 
lieu of that child’s parent. And as noted in Justice McKinnon’s dissent, 
this case also marks the Montana Supreme Court’s first appointment of a 
guardian ad litem to represent minor children in the contemplation of 
litigation as opposed to when proceedings are actually pending. Given the 
state’s typical reluctance to impede upon the fundamental right of a fit 
parent to raise his children, it is interesting that this Court did not trust the 
father to put the interests of his children above his own interests in light of 
a conflict of interest. 
  
B.   Concerns Regarding Title-Hopping 
 
Although the majority effectively explained its reasoning for 
utilizing guardianship statutes from various titles within the Montana 
Code Annotated, there remains an underlying concern when an 
appointment of a guardian relies on statutory authority that does not 
directly stem from the statute used to appoint the guardian in the first 
place. The guardian was initially appointed under Mont. Code Ann. § 25–
5–301,53 which lies under the “Civil Procedure” title of the Code. 
However, since the statute did not specifically address whether a minor 
can commence litigation through a guardian, the Court then turned to 
Mont. Code Ann. § 41–1–202,54 which lies under the “Minors” title of the 
Code. Since neither of the aforementioned statutes listed the duties of a 
guardian, the Court then looked to Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–205,55 which 
falls under the “Family Law” title of the Code, and more specifically, the 
chapter concerning child custody and support. Lastly, in order to identify 
what the best interests of the children were, the Court cited Mont. Code 
Ann. § 72–5–22356 under the “Estates, Trusts, and Fiduciary 
Relationships” title of the Code. The latter statute falls under the chapter 
governing “persons under disability guardianship and conservatorship” 
under the Uniform Probate Code. The Court ultimately used statutes from 
                                           
52 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. 
53 In re Conservatorship of Minor Children, 362 P.3d at 79. 
54 Id. at 79–80. 
55 Id. at 80. 
56 Id. 
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four different titles of the Montana Code Annotated in reaching its 
decision. Although the Court sufficiently explained its reasoning in tying 
the different statutes together, there is an inescapable conclusion that no 
one statute was sufficient on its own to justify the holding. The elements 
identified and utilized by the Court were drafted and intended to be 
interpreted within its specific title, so applying the statute to a context 
outside of that title carries a risk that it will be misconstrued.  
 
C.   The Children’s Actual Best Interests 
 
Despite the care and attention given to determining who best will 
represent the children’s best interests, at no point in the opinion are the 
children’s actual, stated wishes addressed. Although an attorney was 
appointed to advocate for the children’s stated interests, and a guardian ad 
litem was appointed to advocate for the children’s best interests, neither 
the Court nor the district court directly discussed the children’s opinions 
as to whether they wished to pursue legal claims against their father or his 
business. Although the children now have an attorney and a guardian ad 
litem advocating for them, one would think the children’s actual stated 
wishes as to pursuing litigation against their father would at the very least 
be addressed in the opinion, especially in light of the eldest child’s recent 
attempt on his own life. The voices of minors in proceedings that directly 
impact their lives have historically been muffled by adults who seek to 
advocate for them. This holding lies consistent with that trend. Given the 
tragic circumstances that brought this case to court and the peculiar 
circumstances that may pit the children against their father, one can only 
hope the adults that have been entrusted with deciding how to proceed will 
do so with the children’s opinions in mind.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
